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A look inside the anonymizing software protecting sources across the magazine industry.

If you want to reach Thomas Fox-Brewster, you'dbest be prepared to download new software. In his Twitter bio, Fox-Brewster a security reporter forForbes lists a series of codeswhich will allow anyone with a tip to covertly reach out through an encrypted channel.It might seem inconveniently picky, even a potential obstacle to reaching sources, but Fox-Brewster is among the growing ranks of journalists who have ditched insecurecommunication techniquesin favor of toolslikeSignal and Ricochet.

Encryption has become increasingly commonfor journalists hoping to get the next big story by ensuring sources that their identities stay secret while their secrets go public.There are many options to choose from, some open source and others proprietary, with no consensus on any standard. This leavesnewsrooms to fend for themselves as they try to protect people with secrets without making it too difficult for such whistleblowers to come forward.

Last Thursday,Wiredbecame the latest magazine to publicize its use of SecureDrop, which allows whistleblowers and leakers to anonymously send documents and messages to media organizations without identifying or traceable information. This comes one month afterForbesadopted the program, and four years afterThe New Yorkertook the technology public.

Compared toapplications like Signal and Ricochet, which are used in conjunction with smart phones and personal computers,SecureDrop might be the most secure way to leak documents. But its set up is complex and its yield so far has been low a steep consideration as some news organizations spend up to $3,000 in new hardware, and $10,000 in support contracts with the Freedom of the Press Foundation, which manages the SecureDrop project.

"SecureDrop can be a little bit intensive,"Harlo Holmes, director of newsroom digital security at the Freedom of the Press Foundation, tellsFolio:.Source protection is really difficult to begin withThis is one way that is addressing that problem head on.

THE MOTHER OF INVENTION

SecureDrop was first conceived in 2011 byfamed programmerand activist Aaron Swartz at the request of Kevin Poulsen, an editor atWired.

"Theres a growing technology gap: phone records, e-mail, computer forensics, and outright hacking are valuable weapons for anyone looking to identify a journalists source,"Poulsenwrotein 2013."With some exceptions, the press has done little to keep pace: our information-security efforts tend to gravitate toward the parts of our infrastructure that accept credit cards."

The tool has seen a resurgence since the election of President Donald Trump, who has publiclythreatenedto prosecutegovernment employees who leak documents to the press. However, the origins of SecureDrop harken back to WikiLeaks and Obama-erastrong-armingby the Department of Justice to get journalists to identify confidential sources.

With SecureDrop, theres nothing to identify. Journalists are as ignorant of their sources as the Department of Justice itself. While this creates its own issues in terms of authentication, it frees up reporters from external pressure to reveal sources. This is in contrast to a phone call, which can be tapped or traced through phone companies, or apps like Facebook Messenger;Facebookis explicit in its willingness to reveal the content of messageswhen faced with a valid search warrant.

In an age of pervasive internet surveillance, traditional tools like email and phone calls are no longer enough to safely link reporters and their contacts. The most sensitive sources need a more secure channel, one thats encrypted and anonymous by default, senior writerAndy Greenberg wrotein last week'sannouncementaboutWiredadopting SecureDrop.

A SLOW START

The New Yorkerwas the first magazine to publicize its use of the system in 2013, then under the name Strongbox. Its since been followed byThe Intercept,ProPublica, andThe New York Times publications known for their extensive investigative reporting.The Nationwill alsojoinlater this year.

While many publications embrace the publicity as a means of coaxing tipsters, others prefer to keep their use, well, anonymous. The perils of an open inbox might include an influx of bizarre messages, or in the case ofThe New Yorker, endless poetry and cartoon submissions, according to Holmes.

Michael Luo, editor of NewYorker.com and a former investigative editor atThe New York Times, says that while hes a big fan of the system, it has yet to pay off. Eric Lach, the sites deputy news editor, checks the system every few days, but it hasnt led to any stories.

Were certainly getting tips, but nothing incredibly useful, Luo tellsFolio:.Why is that? I guess I feel like, at this point,The New Yorkeris not necessarily the front-of-mind outlet for those kinds of leaked documents and data, in the way thatThe TimesandProPublica, for example, are.

Elsewhere in the mediasphere, however, stories are trickling in. Last week, Vices Motherboardpublished a storyabout people who spy on their loved ones, informed by data obtained through SecureDrop. In February, Gizmodopublished a recordingof Trump discussing trade tariffs with Wilbur Ross, a then-nominee for Secretary of Commerce.

The proposals came during an apparent phone conversation that was captured on video and provided to Gizmodo via SecureDrop, a portal permitting whistleblowers and sources to reach us while remaining anonymous, the article reads.

INSIDE THE MACHINE

One of the difficulties withSecureDrop is that it requires more work on behalf of the source than just downloading an app, or picking up a phone.

To discreetly share documents or messages with a participating newsroom, tipsters must download Tor, a software program which allows users to circumvent existing tracing mechanisms that reveal location and other information. Tor is best known as an entry port for the Dark Web a difficult-to-access set of websites which sometimes facilitate illegal activities, such as the hiring of hitmen.

Not everyone seeking anonymity is a murderer, however. Tor is often seen as the best bet for sources inside the government or corporations who wish to share information which is of public interest, but puts the source at risk in their personal or professional lives.

Sources are given a random code name which acts as a passcode. They can use this name to reaccess messages at a later date. This code name is different than the name that appears for the journalists on the other side.

For the newsroom, however, things aremore difficult to set up. The Foundation combats this flaw with a sliding pay scale for technical support and training. We know that not every news organization that wants to support public interest journalism is going to be as well funded asThe Washington Post,says Holmes.

For-profit institutions are asked to pay $10,000 for a year of support, which covers installation performed in office by Freedom of the Press Foundation staff the training of journalists and IT, and the set up of a SecureDrop landing page, in accordance with the Foundations best practices. This contract also covers ongoing support.Media organizationsare expected to pay the Foundation's travel expenses as well.

Since SecureDrop is open source (and therefore free), newsrooms can conceiveably set up the system themselves, even using repurposed hardware. For these companies, the Foundation offers a year of support and training for $5000.

While it doesnt matter which specific hardware is used, the Foundation provides recommendations in the range of $2000$3000 per set up.

A fully functioning newsroom setup requires a server to run the application itself; a server to monitor the health of the first server; a dedicated firewall to keep SecureDrop separate from the rest of the newsrooms traffic; computers with the operating system Tails, on which the reporters can view the documents securely; a separate computer generally well-guarded which hosts a user interface on which a specific set of editors (usually only one or two) can review submissions; and USB sticks to transfer the documents from the well-guarded computer to the viewing station, and from the viewing station to a normal computer, where the journalist eventually prepares the documents for publication.

SecureDrop is notoriously challenging to use and takes dedication within a newsroom to check it diligently and respond. But its pretty good now for what weve got, and its only going to get better, Holmes says.

Though SecureDrop was built by and for the magazine industry, several other pieces of software are popular with journalists due to their differing levels of security and ease of use.

Signal

Signal is a secure call and messaging app, run by volunteers and grant-funded programmers under the moniker Open Whisper Systems. Its open source and free to use.

Signal is like WhatsApp for the fearful. Users download an app, which then uses the phones existing number and contact book. All messages are encrypted on both sides, which means that Open Whisper Systems cant see your messages, though communication is not anonymous between users. The good news is, with end-to-end encryption, Open Whisper Systems has nothing to share with law enforcement should they request message transcripts.

Ricochet

Ricochet is a machine-specific instant messaging system which operates through Tor. The free and open-source software isencrypted end-to-end, and anonymized, which means your computer does not know where the messages are coming from.

Contacts are added through a specific serial code which is visible and shareable with other users. However, contact relationships are device specific and dont run through servers or networks.

Open PGP

Open PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is a non-proprietary email encryption software which can be used in conjunction with Windows, Mac and Android mailbox tools, as well as many others. Like the other services, Open PGP uses end-to-end encryption, which makes it difficult for emails to be read if they are intercepted.

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As Journalists Seek Encryption, SecureDrop Proves a Challenge - Folio Magazine