European MPs caution against the impending quantum computing revolution, which promises to undermine current encryption safeguards. Experts echo this urgency, warning that existing security measures for sensitive data are on borrowed time. With quantum computers inching closer to breaking mathematical keys and countries like China showing an insatiable appetite for data, the race is on to develop quantum-safe products.

The specter of quantum computing, with its potential to crack the cryptographic keys that protect everything from personal emails to state secrets, casts a long shadow over the digital world. European MPs, led by Dutch MP Bart Groothuis, have sounded a clarion call in a letter they sent to the European Commission: the cryptography underpinning our computer security systems is a ticking time bomb. This alarm is not unfounded. With quantum computings ability to process complex calculations at breakneck speeds, the security protocols we rely on today could be rendered obsolete almost overnight.

Quantum computing is set to disrupt our computing possibilities, fundamentally disrupting computation. However, quantum computing doesnt come without its own risks, as it has the potential to undermine current data encryption safeguards.

Quantum computers differ radically from todays computers. They utilize qubits, which, through superposition, can represent both one and zero simultaneously. This fundamental change in computation allows quantum computers to solve specific problemslike factoring large numbers, the basis of much of our encryptionexponentially faster than classical computers. When a quantum computer with enough stable qubits comes online, it could break the RSA-2048 encryption, a standard for securing web traffic, within a day. The more optimistic estimates give this scenario an 11 percent chance of occurring within the next five years, a figure that rises to a worrying 33 percent over the next fifteen years.

Quantum technology professor Pepijn Pinkse: The best time to get quantum security right was yesterday.

His inaugural lecture took place early last month; in practice, Pepijn Pinkse has been working as a professor of quantum technology at the University of Twente (UT) for several years. His lecture focused on creating awareness around quantum security and the threat posed by quantum technology. The best time to get quantum security right was yesterday, he said.

In a letter that underscores the gravity of the situation, MEPs laid out the stark timeline we face: switching to a new cryptographic standard could take over a decade, paralleling past transitions like the adoption of the SHA2 hashing algorithm and the AES symmetrical algorithm. The letter implores major organizations to begin preparations immediately for a complete post-quantum cryptography (PQC) transition. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States has already identified algorithms for this purpose, with choices like CRYSTALS-Kyber for public key encryption and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+ for digital signatures.

The MEPs letter recommends that the European Commission, alongside bodies such as the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), and the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), offer clear guidance on what constitutes appropriate security measures in anticipation of quantum capabilities. The MEPs suggest this should include inventorying current algorithms, assessing new cryptographic libraries, deploying hybrid encryption systems, and beginning a phased deployment of NIST-approved standards.

Largest investment in Dutch quantum company to date

Dutch quantum company QphoX has raised a 8 million funding round in a major development for the countrys fast-growing quantum industry. It is the largest investment in a quantum company in the Netherlands to date.

Professor Pepijn Pinkse, a quantum technology expert, previouslypep warned about the risks of quantum computing security. Pinkses work underscores the fundamental shift required in our approach to cryptography. Most current cryptography relies on the difficulty of reversing the multiplication of large prime numbers. Quantum computing, particularly using the Shor algorithm, could make that reversal trivial. Pinkse and other experts indicate that Q-Daywhen current cryptographic security systems capitulate to quantum computingis less than a decade away.

Indeed, the quest to build a quantum computer is not just a scientific challengeits a geopolitical one. The past decade has seen a quadrupling in the number of companies actively developing quantum computing hardware. Investment in the field has been substantial, with multiple funding rounds in the quantum computing market exceeding $100 million between 2022 and 2024. National laboratories and supercomputing centres, often driven by government interest, are pouring resources into early-stage machines. The implications for economic and national security are profound.

It remains to be seen how the European Unions institutions and member states will react to the MEPs letter. Will they heed the warnings and start the necessary transitions to safeguard against the quantum threat? The clock is ticking, and as the MEPs letter makes clear, the time to act is nowbefore the quantum revolution undoes the digital security weve come to rely on.

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European MPs sound alarm over quantum computing's encryption threat - Innovation Origins

Imagine opening your front door wide and inviting the world to listen in on your most private conversations. Unthinkable, right? Yet, in the digital realm, people inadvertently leave doors ajar, potentially allowing hackers, tech companies, service providers and security agencies to peek into their private communications.

Much depends on the applications you use and the encryption standards the apps uphold. End-to-end encryption is a digital safeguard for online interactions. Its used by many of the more popular messaging apps. Understanding end-to-end encryption is crucial for maintaining privacy in peoples increasingly digital lives.

While end-to-end encryption effectively secures messages, it is not foolproof against all cyberthreats and requires users to actively manage their privacy settings. As a cybersecurity researcher, I believe that continuous advancements in encryption are necessary to safeguard private communications as the digital privacy landscape evolves.

When you send a message via an app using end-to-end encryption, your app acts as a cryptographer and encodes your message with a cryptographic key. This process transforms your message into a cipher a jumble of seemingly random characters that conceal the true essence of your message.

This ensures that the message remains a private exchange between you and your recipient, safeguarded against unauthorized access, whether from hackers, service providers or surveillance agencies. Should any eavesdroppers intercept it, they would see only gibberish and would not be able to decipher the message without the decryption key.

When the message reaches its destination, the recipients app uses the corresponding decryption key to unlock the message. This decryption key, securely stored on the recipients device, is the only key capable of deciphering the message, translating the encrypted text back into readable format.

This form of encryption is called public key, or asymmetric, cryptography. Each party who communicates using this form of encryption has two encryption keys, one public and one private. You share your public key with whoever wants to communicate securely with you, and they use it to encrypt their messages to you. But that key cant be used to decrypt their messages. Only your private key, which you do not share with anyone, can do that.

In practice, you dont have to think about sharing keys. Messaging apps that use end-to-end encryption handle that behind the scenes. You and the party you are communicating securely with just have to use the same app.

End-to-end encryption is used by major messaging apps and services to safeguard users privacy.

Apples iMessage integrates end-to-end encryption for messages exchanged between iMessage users, safeguarding them from external access. However, messages sent to or received from non-iMessage users such as SMS texts to or from Android phones do not benefit from this level of encryption.

Google has begun rolling out end-to-end encryption for Google Messages, the default messaging app on many Android devices. The company is aiming to modernize traditional SMS with more advanced features, including better privacy. However, this encryption is currently limited to one-on-one chats.

Facebook Messenger also offers end-to-end encryption, but it is not enabled by default. Users need to start a Secret Conversation to encrypt their messages end to end. End-to-end encrypted chats are currently available only in the Messenger app on iOS and Android, not on Facebook chat or messenger.com.

WhatsApp stands out for its robust privacy features, implementing end-to-end encryption by default for all forms of communication within the app.

Signal, often heralded by cybersecurity experts as the gold standard for secure communication, offers end-to-end encryption across all its messaging and calling features by default. Signals commitment to privacy is reinforced by its open-source protocol, which allows independent experts to verify its security.

Telegram offers a nuanced approach to privacy. While it provides strong encryption, its standard chats do not use end-to-end encryption. For that, users must initiate Secret Chats.

Its essential to not only understand the privacy features offered by these platforms but also to manage their settings to ensure the highest level of security each app offers. With varying levels of protection across services, the responsibility often falls on the user to choose messaging apps wisely and to opt for those that provide end-to-end encryption by default.

The effectiveness of end-to-end encryption in safeguarding privacy is a subject of much debate. While it significantly enhances security, no system is entirely foolproof. Skilled hackers with sufficient resources, especially those backed by security agencies, can sometimes find ways around it.

Additionally, end-to-end encryption does not protect against threats posed by hacked devices or phishing attacks, which can compromise the security of communications.

The coming era of quantum computing poses a potential risk to end-to-end encryption, because quantum computers could theoretically break current encryption methods, highlighting the need for continuous advancements in encryption technology.

Nevertheless, for the average user, end-to-end encryption offers a robust defense against most forms of digital eavesdropping and cyberthreats. As you navigate the evolving landscape of digital privacy, the question remains: What steps should you take next to ensure the continued protection of your private conversations in an increasingly interconnected world?

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Are private conversations truly private? A cybersecurity expert explains how end-to-end encryption protects you - The Conversation

On February 13, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg Court) issued its verdict in Podchasov v. Russia. The case involved a statute that (i) established a data retention scheme, and (ii) permitted law enforcement to order the decryption of collected data. The applicant in this case, a Telegram user, challenged an order that required Telegram to decrypt their communications protected by end-to-end encryption (E2EE).

This decision is particularly important because a case involving the weakening of E2EE encryption is uncharted waters for both the Strasbourg Court and the European Court of Justice (Luxembourg Court). This represents a significant victory for privacy advocates as the Strasbourg Court ruled that mandating the decryption of E2EE data constituted a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights the right to privacy. In this analysis, I will delve into the Strasbourg Courts decision, examining both its ruling on the data retention scheme and the decryption of E2EE data.

Data Retention Scheme

The case hinged on the contentious Russian Code of Criminal Procedure and the Operational-Search Activities Act. This law demanded that internet communication organisers (ICOs) store all communication data (metadata) for one year and the content of communications for six months in Russia. The ICOs were mandated to provide all metadata and content data collected by them to law enforcement authorities upon request (Section 10.1(3.1)).

The Strasbourg Court noted that the data retention scheme was very broad in nature. It required the retention of all internet content data and metadata for a prolonged period, without any circumscription of the scope of the measure in terms of territorial or temporal application or categories of persons liable to have their personal data stored (Para 70). The Court found the retention scheme to be exceptionally wide-ranging and serious because:

It affects all users of Internet communications, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activities or activities endangering national security, or of any other reasons to believe that retention of data may contribute to fighting serious crime or protecting national security (Para 70).

The Strasbourg Court held that the data retention and access scheme violated the right to privacy, as it did not offer adequate safeguards against abuse, considering the seriousness of the interference. The Court noted that it had previously examined the same statute in the case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia (2015), and the data retention and access scheme were subject to the same procedures and safeguards (Para 74). Therefore, the Court did not carry out its analysis of legality (quality of law) de novo, it found no reasons to reach a different conclusion in the present case (Para 75). The Court concludes that this legislation permits the public authorities to have access, on a generalised basis and without sufficient safeguards, to the content of electronic communications. Therefore, it impairs the very essence of the right to respect for private life (Para 80). The language in the concluding paragraph and the rationale of the Court, closely aligns with the Luxembourg Court decision in Schrems I (2015), even though its not directly referenced here.

Podchasov continues the Strasbourg Courts trend of focusing on procedural inadequacies rather than substantive issues, a phenomenon termed procedural fetishism by Zalnieriute. For example, in the case of Big Brother Watch and Centrum fr Rttvisa (2021), the Court highlighted procedural flaws in the bulk surveillance law without explicitly examining whether bulk interception itself is inherently impermissible. These two decisions have normalised mass surveillance/bulk interception within the Strasbourg Courts jurisprudence. This trend can also be observed in the approach of the Luxembourg Court, exemplified by the verdicts in Privacy International and La Quadrature du Net (2020).

Similarly, in Podchasov, the Court limits its analysis to the legality of the data retention and access scheme without considering whether such a broad scheme could inherently violate Article 8 (right to privacy). While Podchasov recognizes that bulk data retention constitutes a serious interference, affecting all users of Internet communications, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. (Para 70) However, it fails to take the next step and concludes that such a significant infringement cannot be justified.

Decryption Order

Section 10.1(4.1) of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure and the Operational-Search Activities Act, requires ICOs to provide, along with the requisite metadata and content data, any information necessary to decrypt communications. The Federal Security Service ordered Telegram to help decrypt communications for six mobile numbers, including the applicants, by providing data relating to the [encryption] keys. These six users were using the secret chat feature on Telegram, which enables E2EE protection for the messages. This order was challenged by Telegram, the applicant, and others.

The Strasbourg Court at the outset, before initiating its analyses, explains the important role played by encryption within the Internet age:

In the digital age, technical solutions for securing and protecting the privacy of electronic communications, including measures for encryption, contribute to ensuring the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression (see paragraphs 28 and 34 above). Encryption, moreover, appears to help citizens and businesses to defend themselves against abuses of information technologies, such as hacking, identity and personal data theft, fraud and the improper disclosure of confidential information. This should be given due consideration when assessing measures which may weaken encryption (Para 76).

The Strasbourg Court held that the requirement for ICOs to facilitate the decryption of E2EE-protected communication data was a disproportionate measure (Para 79). Two key facts led the Court to an adverse conclusion. Firstly, the Court highlights that enabling decryption for specific individuals would necessitate creating a backdoor, accessible to both law enforcement and malicious actors. Noting:

in order to enable decryption of communications protected by end-to-end encryption, such as communications through Telegrams secret chats, it would be necessary to weaken encryption for all users. These measures allegedly cannot be limited to specific individuals and would affect everyone indiscriminately, including individuals who pose no threat to a legitimate government interest. Weakening encryption by creating backdoors would apparently make it technically possible to perform routine, general and indiscriminate surveillance of personal electronic communications. Backdoors may also be exploited by criminal networks and would seriously compromise the security of all users electronic communications (Para 77).

The Court observation here is an important win for privacy advocates who have argued over the years that E2EE-protected data cannot be accessed without introducing systemic vulnerabilities, posing risks to users, commercial entities, and national interests alike.

Second, while acknowledging that encryption may pose challenges to criminal investigations, the Court observed, relying on expert submissions, that there are alternative encryption-preserving methods of investigation (Para 78). This is indeed correct. There are alternatives to rolling back E2EE that can contribute to the state goals in a real and substantial mannerrelying on metadata or circumventing encryption, for example, by indirectly hacking. Thus, the Court concludes that:

in the present case the ICOs statutory obligation to decrypt end-to-end encrypted communications risks amounting to a requirement that providers of such services weaken the encryption mechanism for all users; it is accordingly not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued (Para 79).

A close reading of this conclusion would suggest that unlike the Courts holding vis--vis the data retention provisions, the Courts determination here of the privacy violation is not contingent on the absence of adequate safeguards. Therefore, the Courts holding is that decryption of E2EE data is, in principle, against the right to privacy, regardless of the degree of robustness of safeguards in place. In this context, member states do not possess any acceptable margin of appreciation (Para 80).

Conclusion

Podchasov is a landmark decision, which safeguards encryption, which has become sine qua non for secure and confidential communication in the digital age. The decision offers valuable lessons for other courts where similar issues may arise, given that E2EE has been under threat in multiple countries globally in the last decade. The Court did not afford the state any leeway while examining the decryption provision, considering the severity of potential harm.

While adjudicating on technical or digital measures, the Court must understand the architecture of the technical measure, including its capabilities, and limitations Equally vital is an appreciation of the socio-political and economic context in which these measures are deployed. The Strasbourg Courts verdict demonstrates a commendable grasp of the cryptographic tools at the heart of this case and the gravity of potentially weakening the encryption standard. This is a result of the Court properly engaging with technical expert evidence.

There is a legal challenge to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, pending before the Indian Supreme Court (SC). This law requires significant social media intermediaries to enable the tracing of the first originator of the information, and critics claim this can weaken the E2EE standard. The Podchasov decision would be a valuable precedent for the Indian SC, which has in the past significantly relied upon the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court and Luxembourg Court to develop its conception of informational privacy and the principles of data protection.

The Strasbourg Courts ruling may cast a long shadow over future negotiations for the regulation of child sexual abuse material, proposed by the EU Commission in May 2022. It requires the scanning of messages that could weaken E2EE. This decision may provide greater leverage to representatives from the EU Parliament who oppose scanning and lead to stronger pushback by civil societies and other advocacy groups.

Originally posted here:
Cracking the Code: How Podchasov v. Russia Upholds Encryption and Reshapes Surveillance - EJIL: Talk!

Anyone using WhatsApp should know that their chats and calls are end-to-end encrypted, just like on iMessage and Signal. Its a security feature WhatsApp had before Meta bought the app. Its also probably the reason WhatsApp was the only encrypted chat app Meta operated for so long. Facebook Messenger started rolling out end-to-end encryption only a few months ago.

Since encryption is a strong selling point of WhatsApp, you might think the feature doesnt need advertising. Chats and calls will remain end-to-end encrypted despite insert reason to worry. And some users did have reasons to worry not too long ago.

Remember when Meta (then Facebook) made that controversial privacy change to WhatsApp a few years ago? And now, Meta is getting ready to support third-party chats in WhatsApp in the EU.

Meta will continue to reinforce its commitment to end-to-end encryption whenever it has to discuss security- and privacy-related WhatsApp matters.

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With that in mind, I think WhatsApp reminding users that their chat apps are end-to-end encrypted from within the chat app is a good practice. One that should be available on iPhone and Android soon.

Discovered by WABetaInfo in the latest WhatsApp beta for Android, the feature puts the status of encryption front and center, as seen in the screenshot below.

A caption that identifies a chat as end-to-end encrypted appears briefly under the name of the contact youre chatting with. The caption will disappear after a few seconds so the last seen information can appear in the same place.

But the encryption indicator is still a great addition to the app. It should appear for every chat in the app, even if just briefly.

As I said, tech-savvy users take WhatsApp end-to-end encryption for granted. They might not need the indicator above. But it would be a great marketing tool for Meta to promote the security of WhatsApp.

Moreover, I think its all the more important in the European Union, where WhatsApp will have to work with other chat apps. Meta has explained its looking to enforce encryption via WhatsApps Signal protocol or something equally strong. At the same time, Meta acknowledged it cant offer the same security guarantees.

The encryption indicator could be a great tool to use if you plan on chatting with people using third-party apps. It could tell you if the conversation remains secure or not.

Come to think of it; the DMA might finally give us the Instagram-Facebook-Messenger-WhatsApp tool that Meta once promised. Not all three apps are end-to-end encrypted. Thats one instance where the encryption indicator might come in handy. That said, theres no reason to think Meta will want to make its own apps interoperable.

Also, theres no confirmation from Meta that the encryption indicator will roll out to the public version of the app. However, there is precedent. Facebook Messenger has started identifying which chats are end-to-end encrypted.

The indicator is not as visiable as the one in WhatsApp above. You have to tap a contacts profile picture in Facebook Messenger and see if a permanent end-to-end encrypted marker appears under your friends name. Not all chats in your Facebook Messenger are encrypted because the feature is still rolling out to users. Also, users must enable encryption by choosing a password.

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WhatsApp encryption status might appear at the top of chats - BGR